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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The flood of litigation predictable following the decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v 
Kernott1 has occurred.  Much could be said about the meaning of the Court’s approach to the 
quantification of beneficial interests under common intention constructive trusts in cases 
where both parties to a personal relationship appear on the legal title of a shared home.2  The 
focus of this article, however, is a situation with which Jones was not directly concerned but 
for which it could have profound implications.  That scenario, beloved of property law and 
family law examiners but also of immense practical importance for parting couples who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Earlier versions of this article were presented at a Cambridge Private Law Seminar in February 2013, and at a 
symposium entitled ‘Trusts of the Family Home and the Frontiers of Family Property: Domestic and 
Comparative Perspectives’ at Durham Law School in April 2013 (sponsored by the Modern Law Review). The 
author is very grateful to Amy Goymour and Andrew Hayward for organising the respective events, and to the 
attendees, Philippa Daniels and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments, though all errors are his 
own.  
1 [2011] UKSC 53, [2012] 1 AC 776. 
2 See, eg, M Pawlowski ‘Imputed intention and joint ownership – a return to common sense: Jones v Kernott’ 
[2012] Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 149; M Yip ‘The rules applying to unmarried cohabitants’ family home: 
Jones v Kernott’ [2012] Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 159; J Mee ‘Jones v Kernott: Inferring and imputing in 
Essex’ [2012] Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 167. 
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entered neither a marriage nor a civil partnership, is one where there is only one legal owner 
of a home and the other party to a cohabiting relationship seeks to establish that he has an 
equitable interest in the home under a common intention constructive trust. 
This article examines the considerable number of common intention constructive trust 
cases that have been decided since the judgments in Jones v Kernott were handed down.3  It 
focuses particularly on the judicial treatment of the establishment (as distinct from the 
quantification) of a beneficial interest by a legal non-owner in a domestic context.  The 
second part summarises the recent history of claims by legal non-owners and examines the 
possible implications of Jones for such claims, before the main part of the article analyses the 
early judicial response to the case.  The article argues that while judges have mostly accepted 
that Jones is relevant to sole-owner cases, they have had few opportunities (and taken fewer) 
to allow novel outcomes in the light of it as yet.  If this produces a conservative approach it is 
normatively problematic for cohabitants who make indirect or non-financial contributions to 
shared lives and remain without statutory property and financial provision on relationship 
breakdown. This is true even if the constructive trust is not the most appropriate method 
through which to produce a more normatively justifiable outcome, and even if caution is 
appropriate in the light of stare decisis. 
 
2.   LEGAL NON-OWNERS, THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND THE SUPREME COURT 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jones was also cited in Dunn v Institute of Cemetery and Crematorium Management [2012] ICR 941 (EAT) at 
[41] (Judge McMullen QC) to illustrate the differences in the legal treatment of married as compared to 
unmarried couples; and in V v V [2011] EWHC 3230 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1315 at [81] (Charles J) to emphasise 
the dangers of treating judicial ‘concepts, guidance or principles’ as though they had statutory force.  In Z v A 
(Financial Remedies: Overseas Divorce) [2012] EWHC 467 (Fam), [2012] 2 FLR 667 its principles on inference 
were used to ascertain whether the parties had an understanding that they would make no claims from each other 
in the event of divorce. 
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While credit for developing the common intention constructive trust is generally given to 
Lord Diplock following his speech in Gissing v Gissing4 in the light of Pettitt v Pettitt,5 it has 
been the subject of ‘a long stream of authority’6 in both the House of Lords7 and the Court of 
Appeal8 in addition to its more recent trip to the Supreme Court in Jones v Kernott.9  It has 
been described as ‘a specific jurisprudential response’ to problems of ownership relating to 
family homes,10 ‘driven by policy considerations and the special facts that normally apply in 
the dealings between those living in an intimate relationship’,11 and its development has been 
branded a ‘familialisation’ of property law.12  While judges are able to reallocate the property 
of married couples on divorce (and civil partners in the equivalent predicament) on the basis 
of a statutory discretion,13 it is well known in the academy that there is no analogous 
legislation in the case of unmarried couples whose relationship has broken down while both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 [1971] AC 886 HL. 
5 [1970] AC 777 HL. 
6 Crown Prosecution Service v Piper [2011] EWHC 3570 (Admin) at [7] (Holman J). 
7 Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 HL, Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 432. 
8 See, eg, Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 CA; Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546, [2005] Fam. 211; 
Morris v Morris [2008] EWCA Civ 257, [2008] Family Law 521; James v Thomas [2007] EWCA Civ 1212, 
[2008] 1 FLR 1598; Fowler v Barron [2008] EWCA Civ 377, [2008] 2 FLR 831; Laskar v Laskar [2008] 
EWCA Civ 347, [2008] 1 WLR 2695. 
9 [2011] UKSC 53. 
10 Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, [2012] 2 All ER 754 at [85] (Etherton LJ). 
11 Crossco No 4 Unlimited [2011] EWCA Civ 1619 at [85]. 
12 See, eg, A Hayward ‘“Family property” and the process of “familialisation” of property law’ [2012] Child & 
Family Law Quarterly 284. 
13 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Pt II; Civil Partnership Act 2004, Sch 5.  Cf. Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 
2013, s 11. 
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parties are still alive.14  The need for such legislation is a hotly debated question that cannot 
be conclusively resolved by this article.15  
Whatever its drawbacks, and whatever the perceived need for statutory reform, the 
common intention constructive trust potentially enables an unmarried cohabitant to assert that 
the equitable ownership of the home differs from the legal ownership on the basis of an 
express or implied common intention between the parties, notwithstanding the absence of an 
express declaration of trust in his favour.  This allows the claimant to avoid the rigidity of a 
resulting trust analysis, which would allocate fixed shares proportionate to the parties’ direct 
financial contributions to (or possibly financial liability in respect of)16 the property.  Indeed, 
in Jones the resulting trust was considered to be inappropriate in domestic cases involving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See, eg, Law Commission ‘Statement on the Government’s Response to the Law Commission Report 
“Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown”’ (6 September 2011), concerning the 
current Government’s decision not to implement the recommendations contained in Law Commission, 
Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (Law Com No 307, London: HMSO, 
2007) during the current Parliament. For a recent comparative discussion, see A Sanders ‘Cohabitants in Private 
Law: Trust, Frustration and Unjust Enrichment in England, Germany and Canada’ (2013) 62 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 628. 
15 See, eg, R Deech ‘The case against legal recognition of cohabitation’ (1980) 29 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 480. Probert has suggested that few unmarried couples are left without any property-based legal 
protection on relationship breakdown: R Probert ‘Cohabitation: Current legal solutions’ in C O'Cinneide (ed), 
Current Legal Problems – Volume 62 (Oxford: OUP, 2009) p 341.  Cf. Lady Hale’s suggestion (in Gow v Grant 
[2012] UKSC 29, 2013 SC (UKSC) 1 at [47]) that ‘a family law remedy such as that proposed by the Law 
Commission would be less costly and more productive of settlements as well as achieving fairer results than the 
present law’ in England and Wales. See J Miles ‘Cohabitation: lessons for the south from north of the border?’ 
[2012] CLJ 492 for discussion of the case, which concerned the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, but cf. S 
Gardner ‘Problems in family property’ [2013] CLJ 301 for criticism. 
16 See the remarks of Lord Neuberger in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at [117]–[120] and in Laskar v 
Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347 at [27]–[31]. 
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family homes.17 Detrimental reliance by the claimant was also traditionally required for a 
constructive trust.  While this was not expressly mentioned either by the House of Lords in 
Stack v Dowden18 or the Supreme Court in Jones, it would be difficult to justify the 
intervention of equity in the absence of such reliance due to the need for some form of 
unconscionability.  It must surely be a vital factor in the court’s evaluation of what is ‘fair’ 
when imputing a common intention to the parties during the process of quantifying the extent 
of a party’s interest under a constructive trust.19  The requirement was sufficiently 
fundamental that a mere failure to mention it cannot safely be taken as evidence of its demise.  
Indeed, in the post-Jones Court of Appeal decision in Smith v Bottomley, detrimental reliance 
was considered to be ‘a critical element of [the] claim to a beneficial interest in the properties 
in question…by way of constructive trust’,20 and the outcome partly turned on the point.21 
One of the most difficult aspects of the developing law on the common intention 
constructive trust is that the two cases most recently decided at the highest judicial level were 
in substance focused on the quantification of equitable interests held by joint legal owners 
rather than the establishment of interests.  In a sense, the sole legal owner scenario is rather 
more significant, since it concerns the claim of a legal non-owner who may lack an 
entitlement altogether while a joint legal owner is unlikely to go away empty-handed.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [25], [53] (Lady Hale and Lord Walker).  Cf. Lord Neuberger’s dissenting speech in 
Stack [2007] UKHL 17, and Chaudhary v Chaudhary [2013] EWCA Civ 758, [2013] Family Law 1257. 
18 [2007] UKHL 17.  See, eg, T Etherton ‘Constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel: the search for clarity and 
principle’ [2009] Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 104 for discussion.  
19 See the text to 50 below. 
20 [2013] EWCA Civ 953, [2013] 2 P & CR DG25 at [31] (Sales J).  See also, eg, Re Ali [2012] EWHC 2302 
(Admin), [2012] Family Law 1324 at [108] (Dobbs J). 
21 See the text to n 145 below. 
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Following the 1990 decision of the House of Lords in Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset,22 the 
common intention of shared ownership necessary to prove a constructive trust could be 
evidenced either by express discussions ‘that the property is to be shared beneficially’, 
‘however imperfectly remembered and however imprecise their terms may have been’,23 or by 
the implication drawn from ‘direct contributions to the purchase price by the partner who is 
not the legal owner, whether initially or by payment of mortgage instalments’.24  In 
Lord Bridge’s infamous words, it was ‘at least extremely doubtful whether anything less 
[would] do’,25 causing problems with Lees’ recent suggestion that any expansion of Lord 
Bridge’s approach is ‘not inconsistent’ with his comments.26  A focus on express discussion 
or direct financial contributions clearly prejudiced those legal non-owning cohabitants who 
could not point to express discussions and had made only indirect financial or purely domestic 
contributions, particularly where those contributions in substance facilitated the acquisition of 
the equity in the home by the other party to the relationship,27 often through the payment of 
one particular regular bill (ie the mortgage).  It also prioritised financial contributions in a 
manner similar to that widely considered undesirable in the context of the resulting trust, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 [1991] 1 AC 107. 
23 Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 at 132 (Lord Bridge). 
24 Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 at 133 (Lord Bridge). 
25 Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 at 133.  Cf. Le Foe v Le Foe [2001] 2 FLR 970. 
26 K Lees ‘Geary v Rankine: Money isn't everything’ [2012] Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 412 at 417-418. 
27 See, infamously, Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317 CA, discussed, eg, in J Mee ‘Burns v Burns: The Villain of the 
Piece?’ in R Probert, J Herring and S Gilmore (eds) Landmark Cases in Family Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011). Gardner has asserted with surprising confidence not only that Burns would not be decided in the same 
way today, but also that ‘a modern Mrs Burns would have maybe half the equity in the home, very possibly 
more’: S Gardner ‘Problems in Family Property’ [2013] CLJ 301 at 306. Cf. Thomson v Humphrey [2009] 
EWHC 3576 (Ch), [2010] 2 FLR 107 at [29] (Warren J). 
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albeit with express discussions providing an alternative route to entitlement for some 
fortunate parties. 
It is unclear whether the majority of the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden (decided 
17 years after Rosset) were intending to liberalise or restrict the earlier analysis in Rosset.  In 
that ‘joint names’ case, which generated an inordinate amount of academic commentary,28 
Lady Hale held that ‘at least in the domestic consumer context’29 there is a strong 
presumption that ownership in equity follows the position at law.30  This suggests that a legal 
non-owner who is not a beneficiary under an express trust has to rebut a strong presumption 
in order to demonstrate that he has any (equitable) interest at all.31  That said, the strength of 
the presumption was undermined by the myriad factors that are said to be relevant to its 
displacement, at least when quantifying the interest in a ‘joint names’ case, on the basis of 
common intention.  These were set out at length but non-exhaustively by Lady Hale at 
paragraph 69 of the Stack decision.32   Some of the relevant considerations, including ‘the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See, eg, M Dixon ‘The never-ending story – co-ownership after Stack v Dowden’ [2007] Conveyancer & 
Property Lawyer 456; M Harding ‘Defending Stack v Dowden’ [2009] Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 309; W 
Swadling ‘The common intention constructive trust in the house of lords: an opportunity missed’ (2007) 123 
LQR 511; R Probert ‘Cohabitants and joint ownership: The implications of Stack v Dowden’ [2008] Family Law 
924; T Etherton ‘Constructive trusts: A new model for equity and unjust enrichment’ [2008] CLJ 265; S Gardner 
‘Family property today’ (2008) 124 LQR 422. 
29 Stack [2007] UKHL 17 at [58] (Lady Hale). 
30 See A Briggs ‘Co-ownership and an equitable non sequitur’ (2012) 128 LQR 183; J Mee ‘Ambulation, 
severance, and the common intention constructive trust’ (2012) 128 LQR 500 for a discussion of the difficult 
questions of severance arising from the notion that a joint tenancy in equity is presumed from a joint tenancy at 
law. 
31 Stack [2007] UKHL 17 at [56] (Lady Hale).  
32 Stack [2007] UKHL at [69] (Lady Hale).  See, eg, M Dixon ‘Casenotes editor's casenotes’ [2007] 
Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 352 for criticism. 
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nature of the parties’ relationship; whether they had children for whom they both had 
responsibility to provide a home…how the parties arranged their finances…[and] how they 
discharged the outgoings on the property and their other household expenses’, need not 
necessarily be connected to financial contributions to the purchase of the home or discussions 
as to its acquisition.  Moreover, there were also suggestions in Stack that the law had already 
‘moved on’ since Lord Bridge’s remarks in Rosset33 and that he ‘set [the] hurdle rather too 
high’,34 and it is significant that the allegedly strong presumption that equity follows the law 
was said to be displaced in Stack itself as well as in subsequent cases.35    
In subsequent ‘sole name’ cases, English judges were largely reluctant to accept 
Stack’s possible invitation to regard the law as having already ‘moved on’ since Rosset.  In 
fact, while the judge in the first instance case of Hapeshi v Allnatt cited the proposition that 
‘in response to changing social and economic conditions, the common intention [relevant to 
establishment of an interest] may be inferred (or perhaps imputed) from the parties’ whole 
course of conduct in relation to the property’,36 an unfortunately restrictive approach was in 
evidence in other cases.  In the Court of Appeal case of James v Thomas, for example, a 
cohabitant engaged in unpaid manual work in her partner’s business, thereby effectively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Stack [2007] UKHL at [26] (Lord Walker). 
34 Stack [2007] UKHL at [63] (Lady Hale).  See also Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53, [2008] 1 FLR 1451 at 
[3]-[6] (Lady Hale, giving the advice of the board). 
35 See, eg, Adekunle v Ritchie [2007] EW Misc 5 (EWCC), [2007] B.P.I.R. 1177 but cf. Fowler v Barron [2008] 
2 FLR 831. 
36 [2010] EWHC 392 (Ch), [2010] WTLR 987 at [18] (Judge Hodge QC), citing C Harpum, S Bridge & M 
Dixon Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 7th edn, 2008) at [11-025].  
(The phrase ‘it is now clear that’ seems to have been inserted between ‘economic conditions’ and ‘the common 
intention’ in the equivalent paragraph of the 8th edition (2012).)   See M Dixon, ‘Editor’s notebook: The still not 
ended, never-ending story’ [2012] Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 83 at 84 on the weakness of the authority of 
Hapeshi on this point. 
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contributing to the mortgage on the property owned by him.37  Sir John Chadwick decided 
that:  
 
‘…what [the claimant] was doing gives rise to no inference that the parties had agreed 
(or had reached a common understanding) that she was to have a share in the property: 
what she was doing was wholly explicable on other grounds’.38 
 
The defendant’s remarks to the effect that improvements to the property would ‘benefit us 
both’ were held to relate to the couple’s quality of life in the property rather than being 
‘intended or understood to be a promise of some property interest’,39 which is a harsh 
conclusion even in the light of Rosset. Miss James was denied an interest in spite of Mr 
Thomas’ candid concession that it would be ‘fair’ for her to have one,40 although a measure of 
justice was done in that she was held to be a partner in his business and it was understandable 
that the Court of Appeal was anxious to avoid imputation even though that is now permissible 
at the quantification stage following Jones. 
In another post-Stack sole-owner case, Thomson v Humphrey, Warren J held that in 
relation to the establishment question ‘it is necessary to go back to Lloyds Bank v Rosset’,41 
and that ‘[m]uch of what was said’ in Stack related to the quantification question.42  In his 
distinctly cautious view, while ‘[a]ccepting that matters have moved on since Lord Bridge's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 [2007] EWCA Civ 1212. 
38 James [2007] EWCA Civ 1212 at [27]. 
39 James [2007] EWCA Civ 1212 at [33]. It should also be noted that Ms James had conceded that Mr Thomas 
was ‘evasive’ and ‘unwilling’ when she raised the issue of putting the property into joint names (at [38]). 
40 James [2007] EWCA Civ 1212 at [37].  
41 [2009] EWHC 3576 (Ch) at [26]. 
42 Thomson [2009] EWHC 3576 (Ch) at [25]. 
10 
	  
restrictive requirement’, it was ‘not sensible to attempt to say what will and will not be 
enough’.43 
 Jones v Kernott, by Lord Walker and Lady Hale’s own admission, then gave the 
Supreme Court ‘the opportunity to revisit the decision of the House of Lords in Stack v 
Dowden’ in late 2011.44  In their joint lead judgment, they confirmed that ‘the task of seeking 
to show that the parties intended their beneficial interests to be different from their legal 
interests was not to be “lightly embarked upon”[45]’.46  On the quantification point raised by 
the ‘joint names’ case, it was held that if the parties do seek to show that the legal and 
equitable interests differ either at the time of acquisition of the relevant property or later, 
‘[t]heir common intention is to be deduced objectively from their conduct’.47  It is necessary 
to ascertain ‘the parties’ common intentions as to what their shares in the property would be, 
in the light of their whole course of conduct in relation to it’, with reference inter alia to the 
Stack paragraph 69 factors.48  Where there was clearly an intention that the interests would 
differ from the legal position, but ‘it is not possible to ascertain by direct evidence or by 
inference what their actual intention was as to the shares in which they would own the 
property’, each party is entitled to ‘that share which the court considers fair having regard to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Thomson [2009] EWHC 3576 (Ch) at [29]. 
44 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [1]. 
45 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL at [68] (Lady Hale). 
46 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [12] (Lord Walker and Lady Hale). 
47 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [52]. 
48 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [13]. 
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the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property’,49 via the controversial 
process of imputation.50 
Our immediate concern, however, is the implications of Jones for sole-owner cases.  
Although Jones (like Stack) was a ‘joint names’ case, it confirmed that the presumption that 
equity follows the law applies whether legal title is held by one party or by more than one.  
Lord Walker and Lady Hale held that ‘[a]t a high level of generality’, there is ‘a single 
regime’ governing sole and joint name cases, and they recognised that ‘a “common intention” 
trust is of central importance to “joint names” as well as “single names” cases’.51  Logically, 
however, in a ‘sole name’ case ‘[t]he starting point is different because the claimant whose 
name is not on the proprietorship register has the burden of establishing some sort of implied 
trust, normally…a “common intention” constructive trust’.52  In their analysis Lord Walker 
and Lady Hale made the traditional distinction between the ‘first issue’, a prior one, of 
‘whether it was intended that the other party have any beneficial interest in the property at 
all’, and the ‘second issue’ of ‘what that interest is’.53  In relation to the latter issue, it was 
held that the quantification process should proceed in a sole owner case as outlined above in 
relation to joint owner cases. 
Significantly, however, Lord Walker and Lady Hale suggested that even in relation to 
the ‘first issue’ in a ‘sole name’ case, the common intention of the parties ‘has once again to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [51] (Lord Walker and Lady Hale), citing Chadwick LJ in Oxley v Hiscock [2004] 
EWCA Civ 546 at [69]. 
50 Lord Kerr emphasised that imputation ‘has nothing to do with what the parties intended, or what might be 
supposed would have been their intention had they addressed that question’: Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [74]. 
51 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [16]. 
52 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [17]. 
53 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [52]. 
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be deduced objectively from their conduct’,54 reflecting the terminology employed by Lord 
Diplock in Gissing v Gissing.55 This looks like a significant departure from Rosset, potentially 
implying that at least some of the Stack paragraph 69 factors are relevant to the establishment 
as well as the quantification of interests, but unfortunately the matter is not clear cut and there 
are interpretative arguments to be made on either side.   
On the one hand, admittedly Lord Walker and Lady Hale did not either repeat or refer 
to their earlier suggestions in Stack that Rosset no longer governed the establishment issue, 
and there is a possibility that the phrase ‘once again’ related to the ascertainment of the 
common intention on the quantification of interests rather than their establishment in a ‘sole 
name’ case since the next stage in the analysis is said to be imputation.  The two Justices 
avoided explicitly disapplying Lord Bridge’s restrictions as forming part of the method by 
which the relevant objective deduction on establishment should be performed and, by analogy 
with the detrimental reliance requirement,56 it could be argued that those Rosset restrictions 
were so fundamental to the general understanding of this area of the law that a mere omission 
to cite them in Jones (or in any other relevant case) should not be thought significant.  Lord 
Walker and Lady Hale’s remarks were clearly obiter as regards sole owner cases, and the 
reinforced strength of the presumption that equity follows the law suggests that the legal non-
owner still carries a heavy burden even if he is not restricted to the Rosset criteria.  Moreover, 
Lord Collins explicitly mentioned sole owner cases only to point out that the cases pre-dating 
Stack involved different facts,57 and Lord Kerr did not appear to mention them at all.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [52]. 
55 Gissing [1971] AC 886 HL at 907. 
56 See the text to n 18 above. 
57 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [59]. 
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Nevertheless, on the other side of the argument, it remains true that Lord Walker and 
Lady Hale did not expressly limit the conduct by reference to which the common intention 
could be inferred to the types stipulated in Rosset.  Indeed, they did not cite Rosset at all, and 
the only citation of that earlier case came from Lord Collins when discussing the differences 
between inference and imputation.58  This failure to cite Rosset on the question of establishing 
an interest coupled with the earlier criticism of it in Stack and the implication that it had 
stopped representing the law before Stack was decided suggests that it should no longer be 
followed. Even if there are difficulties with relying on a mere omission to cite it in Jones, the 
analogy with the omission of the detrimental reliance requirement is not exact since, unlike 
Rosset, detrimental reliance was not mentioned in Stack either.  In addition, the deliberate 
repetition of the language of objective deduction from conduct implies that the factors from 
paragraph 69 of Stack are relevant to establishing an interest as well as quantifying it,59 and 
that establishing an interest in a ‘sole name’ cases is equivalent to demonstrating that legal 
and equitable interests should differ in a ‘joint names’ case,60 although it is true that the 
Justices did not expressly refer back to their earlier use of that language in spite of the fact 
that they were prepared to make similar cross-references on the approach to quantification.61  
As regards the obiter status of their remarks, it is clear that Lord Walker and Lady Hale set 
out to provide a coherent framework for both sole and joint owner cases, even if the former 
were not directly relevant on the facts, and Lady Hale expressed the view in Stack that Lord 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [59]. 
59 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [51]-[52]. 
60 See also Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [82] (Lord Wilson), and Pawlowski’s view that ‘the essential inquiry boils 
down to the same thing’ in both sole and joint owner cases: M Pawlowski ‘Imputed intention and joint 
ownership – a return to common sense: Jones v Kernott’ [2012] Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 149 at 158. 
61 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [52], referring to paras [51](4) and [51](5). 
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Bridge’s restrictions in Rosset were themselves obiter,62 presumably because the criteria did 
not need to be set so onerously in order to decide the case.  Finally, while Lord Wilson opined 
that the question whether imputation was permitted in establishing that the legal and equitable 
interest differed (rather than the quantification of the equitable interest) would ‘merit careful 
thought’ in an appropriate case, he did not place any limitations upon the methods by which 
such an intention could be inferred.63 
Given the policy objections to Rosset and the fact that the upper echelons of the 
judiciary have (perhaps deliberately) created uncertainty as to the extent to which it still 
applies, it would be normatively desirable for the lower courts to move beyond Rosset if 
necessary in a given case even if they are reined in by a subsequent Supreme Court decision. 
That would force the Supreme Court to confront the issue head-on, which would be of general 
benefit to the law and parties to future disputes even if it would be costly for one set of 
litigants.  The system of precedent may cause difficulties for the lower courts in taking a bold 
approach,64 but it is worth noting that Lord Reid as far back as Gissing v Gissing saw ‘no 
good reason’ for the distinction between direct and indirect financial contributions, opining 
that ‘in many cases it would be unworkable’,65 and that Lord Walker used the past tense when 
asserting in Stack that the law had moved on.66  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Stack [2007] UKHL 17 at [63]. See also K Lees ‘Geary v Rankine: Money isn't everything’ [2012] 
Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 412 at 418. 
63 Jones [2011] UKSC 53 at [84]. 
64 J Lee ‘The Supreme Court and the Doctrine of Precedent’ (Inner Temple Academic Fellow’s Lecture, 
originally given 23 April 2011) 
<http://www.innertemple.org.uk/downloads/education/lectures/lecture_james_lee.pdf> at 11-16 highlights 
similar precedential difficulties with the permission of imputation in Jones.  
65 [1971] AC 886 HL at 896.  See also Lords Pearson (at 903) and Diplock (at 907-8) on the relevance of indirect 
financial contributions where they facilitated mortgage payments by the legal owner.  The remarks of Lords Reid 
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Problems of uncertainty might well abound if a more holistic approach were taken to 
the acquisition question, and the answer to the fundamental question whether a legal non-
owner does or does not have an interest in a given piece of property could become extremely 
difficult to predict before litigation.  It might also be questioned whether the Stack factors that 
go beyond Rosset are appropriate in cases that are ‘domestic’ in character but do not simply 
involve couple-based familial relationships.67  But such difficulties already arise on the 
quantification question and the Stack/Jones approach does at least attempt to consider the full 
range of matters that might be relevant to a common intention between parties to a domestic 
relationship of whatever sort.  Indeed, the whole rationale of the majority approach in Stack 
was a recognition that a narrow focus on matters such as direct financial contributions was 
inadequate as a means of ascertaining common intention in this context.  Even a willingness 
to consider indirect financial contributions would liberalise the law while a refusal to consider 
wholly domestic contributions or to allow common intention to be imputed on the 
establishment question, for example, would place a pragmatic limitation on development and 
prevent a wholesale abandonment of the Rosset framework.  Moreover, it is difficult to find a 
normative justification for treating the ‘establishment’ and ‘quantification’ questions so 
differently when the essential question is ostensibly about the common intention of the parties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Diplock were used by Lord Walker in Stack to support his doubts about Lord Bridge’s approach: [2007] 
UKHL at [26]. 
66 See Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown – A 
Consultation Paper (Law Com No 198, London: HMSO, 2006) at [3.30] for discussion of pre-Stack judicial 
remarks about the permissible bases of inference. 
67 See, eg, Rezaeipoor v Arabhalvai [2012] EWHC 146 (Ch); Gallarotti v Sebastianelli [2012] EWCA Civ 865, 
[2012] 2 FLR 1231.  Cf. B Sloan Informal Carers and Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2013) pp 81-88 for 
a discussion of the application of the common intention constructive trust in cases involving non-conjugal ‘carer’ 
relationships. 
16 
	  
in both cases, though a rather more cautious view is taken by Yip.68  It is also the case that the 
very question considered in this article is itself a considerable cause of uncertainty in the law.   
Whatever the correct view of the implications of Jones as regards establishment of 
interests, and wary of the difficulties in resolving the perpetual normative debate on whether 
the constructive trust should develop to accommodate more legal non-owners, the main part 
of this article explores whether the judiciary have in fact taken the apparent opportunity to 
liberalise the restrictive Rosset approach following Jones. 
 
3.   JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO JONES 
 
The many domestic common intention constructive trust cases69 decided since Jones may 
plausibly but broadly be divided into three categories: those where the possible impact of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 M Yip, ‘The Rules Applying to Unmarried Cohabitants’ Family Home: Jones v Kernott’ [2012] Conveyancer 
& Property Lawyer 159 at 162-63. 
69 In addition to the cases discussed in detail in this article, the ‘joint names’ domestic case of Quaintance v 
Tandan (unreported, Chancery Division, 24 July 2012) will have raised some relevant issues, although in the 
absence of a transcript (at the time of writing) it would be unwise to comment further.  The judgment in W v M 
(TOLATA Proceedings: Anonymity) [2012] EWHC 1679 (Fam), [2013] 1 FLR 1513 essentially concerned 
anonymity. In the ‘sole name’ domestic case of Curran v Collins [2013] EWCA Civ 382, the trial judge appears 
to have adopted a restrictive approach.  In granting permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal (largely relating 
to a separate point), Toulson LJ branded the law of trusts ‘potentially unfair to people in the appellant's position’, 
but considered that ‘the judge was constrained to apply the law as it is’ (at [9]).  In Crossco No 4 Unlimited v 
Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, the claimants asserted that by virtue of certain oral discussions, the 
defendants were prevented from operating a break clause in a commercial lease.  In the Court of Appeal (cf. 
[2011] EWHC 803 (Ch), [2011] NPC 38), they based their (unsuccessful) submissions around constructive trusts 
and estoppel.  The common intention variety of constructive trust developed in cases such as Jones was not held 
to apply in a commercial case such as the one at hand. On Etherton LJ’s view it was also distinct from the 
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Jones in moving beyond Rosset was (in some instances rather shamefully) ignored; those 
‘sole name’ cases where the influence of Jones was recognised but the outcome (in terms of 
establishing rather than quantifying the relevant beneficial interest) would have been 
permissible following Rosset; and those where Jones appears to have produced a novel result 
in a ‘sole name’ case. These categories structure the analysis for the remainder of the article, 
although sub-categories are also used. Most of the significant cases, and notably the Court of 
Appeal authorities, appear to fall in the middle category.  Nevertheless, it will be seen that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pallant v Morgan equity (see, originally, [1953] Ch 43) on which the claimants also relied, although McFarlane 
LJ and Arden LJ differed from him in that respect (see also Kearns Brothers Ltd v Hova Developments Ltd 
[2012] EWHC 2968 (Ch)).  It seems that Jones was intended to be cited in KK v MA [2012] EWHC 788 (Fam) at 
[19] (Charles J), but the transcript briefly and probably mistakenly refers to Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13, 
[2011] 2 AC 398.  Chapman v Jaume [2012] EWCA Civ 476, [2012] 2 FLR 830 involved expenditure by the 
claimant on the home registered in his cohabitant’s ‘sole name’, but Lewison LJ opined that the case was about 
neither resulting nor constructive trusts but the claimant’s case ‘that he is simply entitled to have his money 
back’ (at [19]).  In Shirt v Shirt [2012] EWCA Civ 1029, [2012] 3 FCR 304, the law on constructive trusts was 
not analysed in sufficient depth even to distinguish it from that on proprietary estoppel, and Slater v Condappa 
[2012] EWCA Civ 1506 was in substance analysed (without reference to authority) as an estoppel case turning 
on the evidence. Favor Easy Management Ltd v Wu [2012] EWCA Civ 1464 (cf. M Yip and J Lee ‘“Less than 
straightforward” people, facts and trusts: reflections on context: Favor Easy Management Ltd v Wu’ [2013] 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 431),  Shami v Shami [2013] EWCA Civ 227, Mukerjee v Sen [2013] EWHC 
1997 (Ch) and M v M [2013] EWHC 2534 (Fam) raised some relevant issues but the judgments contain no in-
depth discussion of the relevant law.  In Pankhania v Chandegra [2012] EWCA Civ 1438, [2013] 1 P & CR 16), 
the Court of Appeal held that there was in fact an express declaration of trust in relation to the relevant property 
so that reliance on Jones was misplaced.  Finally, the appeal in the ‘joint names’ case of Akhtar v Hussain [2012] 
EWCA Civ 1762 was ultimately confined to the issue of occupation rent (see [2012] EWCA Civ 1170 for the 
judgment on permission to appeal). 
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conclusion arguably inconsistent with Rosset was reached in the successful High Court claim 
in Aspden v Elvy,70 which might have ramifications for the future. 
 
(a)  Jones Ignored or Fully Distinguished? 
 
This section considers cases where Jones was not applied at all.  Such cases, all of them first 
instance authorities that did not involve genuine contests between alleged co-owners but had 
real significance for third parties, can be sub-categorised into those where Jones was not cited 
or considered at all, and those where it was considered but not expressly applied to the facts 
and the Rosset approach was preferred. 
 
(i)   JONES  COMPLETELY IGNORED 
 
One case where Jones seems to have been ignored altogether is Garwood v Ambrose.71  This 
is in spite of the fact that it was a ‘joint names’ case to which Jones should have been directly 
applicable.  Mr and Mrs Ambrose were the registered proprietors of their home. The 
husband’s trustee in bankruptcy sought declarations inter alia that the husband’s beneficial 
interested in the property had not been vested in the wife by virtue of an express or implied 
trust.   
The purported declaration of trust had been made in 2008 using a ‘short, but rather 
unusual’ document stating that ‘Mr and Mrs Ambrose hold the property as tenants in common 
in unequal shares’.72  It also declared, however, that as from 18th July the previous year the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 [2012] EWHC 1387 (Ch), [2012] 2 FLR 807. 
71 [2012] EWHC 1494 (Ch), [2012] BPIR 996. 
72 Garwood [2012] EWHC 1494 (Ch) at [17] (Judge Leaver QC). 
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wife was ‘beneficially entitled to the whole of the remaining net equity in the property’.73  
While Judge Leaver QC accepted that Mr and Mrs Ambrose understood that the wife was 
now the sole beneficial owner because the husband’s equity had been exhausted in 
discharging previous debts, he held that ‘there was no agreement to that effect and no 
declaration of trust’ in July 2007 evidenced by the later deed,74 and that the purported 
declaration of trust in 2008 would (if valid) have been a transaction at an undervalue falling 
foul of the Insolvency Act 1986.75 
The judge then turned to the ‘implied’ (by which he meant constructive) trust issue,76 
and in doing so applied (and indeed mentioned) only Rosset.  In spite of the attempt to declare 
a trust in her favour and the earlier finding that the parties understood the wife to be the sole 
beneficial owner, the judge held there was no constructive trust because there were none of 
the express discussions required by Lord Bridge in order to demonstrate an express common 
intention.  Although they may not have been important on the facts,77 the judge did not 
explicitly address the possibility of even direct financial contributions sufficing as evidence of 
common intention per se following Rosset, focusing on a supposed absence of detrimental 
reliance because Mrs Ambrose had taken on no additional responsibility for the mortgage 
after July 2007 notwithstanding the doubts expressed about the necessity for such reliance 
following Stack and Jones. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Garwood [2012] EWHC 1494 (Ch) at [17]. 
74 Garwood [2012] EWHC 1494 (Ch) at [19]. 
75 Garwood [2012] EWHC 1494 (Ch) at [22]. Any interest by the wife as a direct result of the declaration of trust 
was therefore the subject of an order under the Insolvency Act 1986, s 339 vesting that interest in the husband’s 
trustee in bankruptcy as part of the husband’s estate.   
76 Garwood [2012] EWHC 1494 (Ch) at [23]. 
77 See, eg, Garwood [2012] EWHC 1494 (Ch) at [20] (Judge Leaver QC). 
20 
	  
The fact that the wife was asserting an express or constructive trust over what would 
otherwise have been her husband’s interest while it was seemingly accepted that she already 
held at least a 50% interest rendered the admittedly complex Garwood case similar to a ‘sole 
name’ scenario.  Nevertheless, it was self-evidently not a ‘sole name’ scenario in a technical 
sense, and it is odd to say the very least that Judge Leaver QC failed expressly to follow the 
approach set out in Jones v Kernott to be applied in ‘joint names’ cases.  Even from the 
perspective of genuine legal non-owners, it is worrying that Rosset can still be seen as the sole 
applicable or even relevant authority (and even then be applied in an incomplete manner) 
notwithstanding developments in the ensuing two decades or more culminating in Jones.  
Garwood’s status as a High Court decision cements its weakness as an authority. 
 Jones was not cited in Rezaeipoor v Arabhalvai either.78  There, the claimant creditor 
had a charging order in respect of a debtor’s interest (if any) in a flat owned at law by the 
debtor’s sister.   Master Bragge had decided (several months before the Supreme Court gave 
judgment in Jones) that the debtor had no interest in the flat since following Stack the burden 
of proof was on the claimant to establish one.  He also held that the creditor ‘had to establish 
on the balance of probabilities that there was an agreement, arrangement or understanding 
between the brother and sister that the sister was a nominee, or that the funds for the purchase 
came from the brother’, and had failed to do so.79 Deputy Judge Kevin Prosser QC held (in 
February 2012) that the Master had ‘correctly’ approached the law on beneficial ownership.80  
The deputy judge omitted to distinguish between resulting and constructive trusts,81 and made 
no comment on the fact the Master’s formulation more obviously reflected Rosset rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 [2012] EWHC 146 (Ch). 
79 Rezaeipoor [2012] EWHC 146 (Ch) at [15]. 
80 Rezaeipoor [2012] EWHC 146 (Ch) at [15]. 
81 See the text to n 16 above. 
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Jones if the case was being analysed as one suiting a constructive trust analysis.  It is at least 
heartening that Rosset was fully applied in substance in that case. 
 
(ii)  JONES CONSIDERED BUT NOT APPLIED TO THE ACQUISITION QUESTION 
 
There have been other cases where, less dramatically than those considered above, Jones has 
been cited but not applied.  Re Ali concerned five properties whose legal title was held solely 
or jointly by a convicted money launderer, Mr Ali.82  Confiscation and restraint orders had 
been made against him, but various members of his family sought to establish, or increase the 
quantum of, a beneficial interest in the properties.  Unlike Garwood and Rezaeipoor, Jones 
was cited (along with Stack) in Dobbs J’s judgment.  However, she held that in considering 
whether a legal non-owner had any interest in the relevant property at all ‘there will need to 
be evidence of an actual agreement, arrangement or understanding between the parties’.83  She 
cited Rosset in support of that proposition, and considered that only in relation to the 
quantification question could the court have regard to the “whole course of dealing” between 
the parties, in order to ascertain their intentions, or, if necessary, to impute them’.84  
Surprisingly, and bringing her analysis closer to that in Garwood, Dobbs J appeared to think 
financial contributions relevant only to the establishment of a resulting, rather than a 
constructive, trust.85  She also held that ‘the carrying out of work on the property of another 
without more (in other words mere conduct), does not provide the party carrying out the work 
with a beneficial interest save in exceptional circumstances’.86  The judge went on to dismiss 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 [2012] EWHC 2302 (Admin). 
83 Re Ali [2012] EWHC 2302 (Admin) at [104]. 
84 Re Ali [2012] EWHC 2302 (Admin) at [105]. 
85 Re Ali [2012] EWHC 2302 (Admin) at [108]. 
86 Re Ali [2012] EWHC 2302 (Admin) at [106]. 
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all claims to a beneficial interests by the legal non-owners on the facts, while opining that 
even if ‘one were to stand back and take the holistic approach’ of Jones to the establishment 
question, ‘there are still difficulties with the applicants’ case’,87 particularly since much of the 
evidence of common intention related to the period after the confiscation and restraint orders 
were made. 
 A similarly restrictive (and, with respect, incorrect) reading even of Rosset was taken 
in Ullah v Ullah, in which the claimant (who had been adjudged bankrupt) sought to establish 
an interest in properties held at law by one or both of his sons.88  While Deputy Judge John 
Martin QC accepted that a common intention could be express or inferred from conduct, 
citing Jones v Kernott, he also considered Lord Bridge’s remarks about express discussions 
and did not even cite the remarks in Rosset about direct financial contributions being relevant 
to a common intention constructive trust.89 Indeed, the deputy judge held that if the claimant 
‘cannot establish a common intention constructive trust’,90 he ‘would in principle be able to 
establish a resulting trust if he could show that he had made direct contributions to the 
purchase price’.91  In rejecting the claims (albeit in the case of two properties because of the 
bankruptcy and a subsequent assignment), the deputy judge therefore focused on discussions 
and financial contributions. 
 Another case that invites pessimism for legal non-owners who would benefit from a 
broader approach, albeit with more impressive legal analysis, is Serious Organised Crime 
Agency v Coghlan.92 In it, the Agency (‘SOCA’) successfully claimed that a property was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Re Ali [2012] EWHC 2302 (Admin) at [148]. 
88 [2013] EWHC 2296 (Ch). 
89 Ullah [2013] EWHC 2296 (Ch) at [6]. 
90 Ullah [2013] EWHC 2296 (Ch) at [6] (emphasis added). 
91 Ullah [2013] EWHC 2296 (Ch) at [6]. 
92 [2012] EWHC 429 (QB), [2012] Lloyd's Rep FC 341. 
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recoverable and that the defendant suspected drug dealer Mr Coghlan had acquired the 
beneficial title to it before obtaining the legal title in 2007.  An aspect of the defence was that 
Mr Coghlan’s cohabiting partner, Ms Burgoyne, had innocently acquired an interest in the 
property by virtue of Jones v Kernott from the moment Mr Coghlan had acquired the legal 
title, and before it was transferred into her and Mr Coghlan’s joint names in 2009.  The 2009 
transfer was considered by Simon J to be ‘no more than the latest step in Mr Coghlan’s 
attempts to place his property beyond the reach of SOCA’,93 and was not made for value such 
that Ms Burgoyne’s supposed interest was still recoverable under the relevant legislation.94 
The judge’s conclusion carries with it an acceptance of SOCA’s submission that there was no 
constructive trust in Ms Burgoyne’s favour before the transfer.  The submission was justified 
on the basis that there was no ‘common intention with some action to her detriment’ and her 
contributions to the interest-only mortgage ‘constituted no greater contribution than the 
payment of an electricity bill’.95  While Jones was at least cited in his judgment, Simon J’s 
analysis does not reflect a realisation of Jones’ possible implications in ‘sole name’ cases as 
compared to Rosset, but the issue was not considered at length.  
It can therefore be seen that the approach of the Supreme Court in Jones has not yet 
reached all judicial corners, although the decision not to apply it has not been taken with 
enormous care in any of the cases considered in this section, even where it has been cited.  It 
is significant that they are all High Court authorities, and also that they occurred in the context 
of debt or crime and were not all genuine contests between putative co-owners.  While some 
such cases could be characterised as ‘investment’ situations better suited to a resulting trust 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Coghlan [2012] EWHC 429 (QB) at [16]. 
94 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 308. 
95 Coghlan [2012] EWHC 429 (QB) at [112]. 
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approach,96 others can remain ‘domestic’ as between the legal owner and the person trying to 
establish or increase an interest in the relevant property in spite of their ‘non-domestic’ wider 
context.97   
That said, the interests of third parties and the associated policy factors might in 
practice assume particular importance in some cases of this sort.  For example, in some such 
cases there could be an increased chance of suspicion that the common intention constructive 
trust is being invoked by some form of ‘wrongdoer’ to defeat the legitimate claims of 
creditors or even the state, and it is probably fair to say that the judges deciding them are both 
under considerable time pressure and less likely to be accustomed to applying the intricacies 
of the law on common intention constructive trusts than some of their colleagues.  This can be 
inferred from the fact that even Rosset does not appear to have been fully understood and 
applied in all of the cases considered in this section.  Such misunderstandings and 
uncertainties, while not perhaps surprising, do little for the coherence of the law.  This is 
particularly true since there are cases with similar facts and contexts (analysed in the next 
section of this article) where Jones was considered relevant, and there are also insufficient 
factual differences to explain the discrepancy between cases where Jones was ignored 
altogether and those where it was considered but deliberately not applied. 
 
(b)  Liberal Principles, Orthodox Results 
 
In spite of the pessimism about the reach of Jones expressed in the previous section, there have 
been a number of ‘sole name’ cases and others in which judges have incorporated its principles 
into their analysis of the current law notwithstanding their partially obiter status.  This is true in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See, eg, Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347. 
97 See, eg, the remarks of Holman J cited in n 111 below. 
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spite of the fact that Jones has not (subject to the possible exception considered in the next 
section) had a conspicuous influence on the outcome of the cases as compared to Rosset.  The 
section begins by setting out the legal analyses undertaken that include Jones in ‘sole name’ 
cases, and then considers the cases grouped by level of court and then by outcome. 
 
(i)   LEGAL ANALYSES 
 
The Court of Appeal has made significant use of the Jones principles since that case was 
decided.  It had an opportunity to consider the impact of Jones in the sole-owner case of Geary v 
Rankine,98 which involved a constructive trust claim by Mrs Geary in respect of a guest house 
purchased and owned at law by her former cohabitant.99   Lewison LJ (with whom Etherton 
and Thorpe LJJ simply agreed) began his analysis of the constructive trust issue by stating 
that Mrs Geary bore the burden of proving that she had any interest at all.  In his view, ‘[t]he 
burden is all the more difficult to discharge where, as here, the property was’, at least initially, 
‘bought as an investment rather than as a home’.100  In spite of this, Lewison LJ clearly stated 
that even in a ‘sole name’ case ‘[t]he search is to ascertain the parties’ actual shared 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 [2012] EWCA Civ 555, [2012] 2 FLR 1409. 
99 She also claimed that she was a partner in the business, and much of her unsuccessful appeal focused on that 
aspect of the case. 
100 Geary [2012] EWCA Civ 555 at [18].  Lewison LJ considered the possibility that the resulting trust applied in 
this case, though clearly he did not think the case to be so investment-focused that the Stack/Jones analysis was 
utterly inappropriate.  Cf., eg, Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347, discussed along with matters of ‘context’ 
in property law in N Piska, ‘Two recent reflections on the resulting trust’ [2008] Conveyancer & Property 
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Academy of Law Journal 110. 
26 
	  
intentions, whether express or to be inferred from their conduct’.101   While he was careful to 
confine the possibility of imputation to cases where an actual intention to share had been 
established and the only uncertainty is as to the size of the interest, this is a significant 
statement at an appellate level since it reflects an appreciation that Lord Walker and Lady 
Hale’s judgment in Jones is relevant to a sole-owner case.  Lewison LJ’s analysis of the law, 
on Lees’ view, ‘ought to put to bed any remaining notions that the restrictions of Rosset still 
apply to the question of acquisition’.102  However, Lees may well exaggerate the position on 
the basis of a mere omission to cite the restrictions in a case where they would in principle 
have been applicable.  The same could be said of  Thompson v Hurst, where Etherton LJ 
similarly asserted that in a ‘sole name’ case such as the one at hand the establishment of an 
interest still depended on ‘evidence of the parties’ actual intentions, express or inferred, 
objectively ascertained’103  and did not mention the Rosset restrictions.  
 In Gallarotti v Sebastianelli,104 which involved a dispute not between a conjugal couple 
but between two ‘single people’ who decided to acquire a flat to share,105 Arden LJ (with whom 
Tomlinson and Davis LJJ simply agreed) nevertheless emphasised that the Court of Appeal was 
not being asked to ‘decide any new question of substantive law’ and boldly opted not to refer to a 
single authority in her judgment.106  Indeed, she went so far as to criticise the Recorder’s first 
instance judgment because it ‘set out in detail the recent authorities on common intention 
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103 [2012] EWCA Civ 1752, [2013] 1 FCR 522 at [19].  See also Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] 
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constructive trust’ in spite of the common ground between the parties.107  She nevertheless 
proceeded to examine ‘the conduct of the parties throughout their relationship’,108 which 
suggests that she had Stack and/or Jones vaguely in mind.  That said, she also agreed with the 
Recorder’s questionable assertion that while this was a domestic case, ‘the principles to be 
applied to a constructive trust were the same whether the parties were in a relationship such as 
that of husband and wife or were business associates, though the court might draw different 
inferences as to their conduct in the latter case’.109  Gallarotti is not, therefore, a particularly 
useful authority. 
 Smith v Bottomley is another problematic Court of Appeal judgment in terms of its legal 
analysis, partly because the Court did not engage in any substantive analysis of the common 
intention question and simply relied on that of Judge Shaun Spencer QC at first instance.  For his 
part, the judge below had held that ‘Ms Smith’s claim...depended completely on the express 
promise made to her by Mr Bottomley’, citing Lloyds Bank v Rosset, and that on the facts ‘no 
inference could be drawn from the parties’ conduct of any wider common intention to share 
property’.110  The very fact that a ‘wider common intention’ was in principle considered relevant 
nevertheless suggests a Jones-inspired approach.  Moreover, the claimant appears to have placed 
specific emphasis on ‘promises’ in her pleadings, and the case ultimately turned on problems 
with the parties to a relevant common intention, the timing of promises and detrimental reliance 
rather than the existence of a common intention between the two cohabitants.  In any event, the 
Court of Appeal could certainly be criticised for failing to provide clarity on the common 
intention point. 
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As well as being influential for the most part in the Court of Appeal when it has engaged 
in legal analysis, and in spite of the cases considered in the last section of this article, Jones has 
also had a significant impact on the apparent understanding of the law in the lower courts even in 
the context of debt or crime.  In Crown Prosecution Service v Piper, a husband and wife both 
sought to demonstrate that the wife had a beneficial interest in their home notwithstanding her 
lack of a legal interest, in order to prevent the house being sold to satisfy a criminal 
confiscation order made against the husband.111  In setting out the relevant legal framework 
agreed by counsel, in contrast to several of the crime and debt cases considered in the 
previous section of this article, Holman J repeated the Jones formulation that the common 
intention of the parties ‘is to be deduced objectively from their conduct’,112 and cited113 Lord 
Diplock’s assertion in Gissing v Gissing that ‘[t]he relevant intention of each party is the 
intention which was reasonably understood by the other party to be manifested by that party's 
words and conduct notwithstanding that he did not consciously formulate that intention in his 
own mind’.114 While Holman J was clear that ‘if the wife has made some financial 
contribution referable to the transfer of [the property] to the husband, it can readily be inferred 
that it was intended that the wife should have a beneficial interest in that property’,115 the 
judge also concurred in the view that paragraph 69 of Stack was ‘illuminating’ as regards 
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29 
	  
establishing, and not merely quantifying, a beneficial interest.116  In Rubin v Dweck, it was 
similarly held that the presumption that a sole legal owner was also the sole beneficial owner 
could be rebutted by a common intention that could ‘arise from express agreement or be 
inferred either by contribution to the purchase price or from the parties’ whole course of 
conduct in relation to the Property’.117  This clearly moves beyond Rosset, albeit that Mr 
Registrar Jones cited Stack rather than Jones as the relevant authority and the decision is one 
of the bankruptcy court in the chancery division.  On the other hand, while Holman J cited in 
CPS v Piper the proposition that the law had moved on from the view of Lord Bridge in 
Rosset, he rather strangely did so when outlining the process of quantification rather than that 
of establishing the interest.118    
In Aspden v Elvy,119 Judge Behrens based his exposition of the law on an extra-judicial 
lecture given by Judge Bridge.120  In ascertaining the correct approach to be taken in a sole-
owner case such as the one at hand, Judge Behrens focused largely on Jones and Stack and 
noted Lord Walker’s remark in Stack about the law having moved on since Rosset.121  In the 
Northern Irish sole-owner case of Bank of Scotland v Brogan,122 meanwhile, Deeny J began 
his analysis with Jones and Stack, and did not cite Rosset at all.  Similarly, in Patel v Vigh, 
Judge Halpern QC did not cite Rosset and was content to adopt ‘as a working formulation’ 
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counsel’s agreed summary of the law, which was ‘drawn largely’ from paragraph 51 of Lord 
Walker and Lady Hale’s judgment in Jones v Kernott.123 
There is therefore a solid recognition amongst a significant portion of the judiciary that 
Stack and Jones are now the leading authorities even in ‘sole name’ cases.  However, it is not 
clear that the result in the majority of these cases, in terms of establishing rather than quantifying 
the interest of the legal non-owner, would have been any different had Rosset been applied.  At 
the same time, it is equally unclear that any failure to establish a beneficial interest in such cases 
has been caused by a reluctance to apply Jones in preference to Rosset.  These matters are 
considered in the following sub-sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii)  SUCCESSFUL COURT OF APPEAL CLAIMS 
 
The successful claim to a beneficial interest in Gallarotti v Sebastianelli involved a flat vested in 
Mr Sebastianelli’s ‘sole name’.124  The parties had an agreement (not amounting to an express 
trust) to the effect that they would have equal shares in the flat, but also agreed that the claimant 
Mr Gallarotti would increase his payments towards Mr Sebastianelli’s mortgage to 
counterbalance the former’s lower contribution towards the purchase price.125  Ultimately, 
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124 [2012] EWCA Civ 865. 
125 Gallarotti [2012] EWCA Civ 865 at [11]. 
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however, he was found to have made ‘no real contribution at all’ towards the mortgage.126  His 
failure to rectify the disparity meant that ‘the agreement for 50/50 sharing was at an end’,127 and 
the Court of Appeal ultimately held that Mr Sebastianelli owned 75% of the beneficial interest as 
compared to Mr Gallorotti’s 25%, reflecting their financial contributions.  Irrespective of the 
quantification issue, and in spite of Arden LJ’s reluctance to engage explicitly with the case 
law, it is plain that Gallarotti v Sebastianelli was a clear-cut case as regards establishment of 
the claimant’s beneficial interest.  Mr Gallarotti would easily have established an interest 
under Rosset by virtue of his direct contribution to the purchase price and probably the 
agreement as to beneficial ownership.  Indeed, a panel of Justices refused Mr Gallarotti 
permission to appeal to the Supreme Court because his case did not ‘raise an arguable point of 
law of general public importance’.128 
Thompson v Hurst is a more difficult case to categorise within the framework adopted 
by this article,129 largely because of a lack of clarity in the judgment of District Judge Spencer 
at first instance (as summarised by the Court of Appeal).  It involved the shared home of the 
appellant and respondent couple, which was ultimately purchased by the respondent using a 
right-to-buy discount. The judge found that there was ‘a common intention on the part of the 
appellant and the respondent, communicated to each other…, that they would buy the 
Property jointly’.130  The couple were nevertheless advised that because of the appellant’s 
patchy employment history, the respondent should apply for the acquisition mortgage alone.  
The property was also purchased in the ‘sole name’ of the respondent.  While the judge was 
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seemingly ‘satisfied…that there was a common intention that the appellant was to have a 
beneficial share in the Property’ notwithstanding the change of plan regarding the legal 
ownership,131 in the very next paragraph she mysteriously held that ‘there was no common 
intention about the beneficial aspect because neither of them thought about it’.132  In the Court 
of Appeal, Etherton LJ confessed to having ‘some difficulty in understanding’ the judge’s 
conclusion that there was a common intention as to shared ownership given her finding that 
the parties had given no thought to the beneficial ownership,133 although he was unable to 
disturb it.  Etherton LJ also described the judge’s decision as one that the common intention 
‘was to be inferred’ from their original intention about shared legal ownership, in spite of the 
presence of express discussions.134 
It may be that while express discussions took place as to the legal ownership of the 
property in Thompson, the judge somehow found that there was no express discussion 
relevant to the equitable ownership in the light of the decision to alter the transaction.  While 
on this analysis a novel outcome could have been reached as compared to Rosset since the 
judge declared that the (eventual) appellant had a 10% share, the distinction between the types 
of discussion seems a remarkably fine one.  Given the suggestion that express discussions of 
some sort took place, and the possibility that the judge meant merely that the parties had 
given no thought to the quantum of the equitable interests, it seems likely that Thompson can 
be seen as consistent with Rosset in spite of the apparent absence of direct financial 
contributions either to the deposit or the mortgage on the part of the appellant.  In any event, 
the appeal ultimately concerned the quantification of the appellant’s beneficial interest 
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(specifically his unsuccessful claim that it should be 50% because of the original intention to 
put the property in joint names), and there was no cross-appeal as to whether he should have 
any beneficial interest at all.  Thompson is not, therefore, a strong authority for the proposition 
that the Rosset restrictions no longer apply to ‘sole name’ cases.   
Taken together, however, Gallarotti and Thompson appear to suggest that at least a 
Jones-inspired approach can lead to a successful claim by a legal non-owner in the context of 
both conjugal and non-conjugal personal relationships. 
 
(iii)   UNSUCCESSFUL COURT OF APPEAL CLAIMS 
 
Not all legal non-owners have been so successful before the Court of Appeal as the claimants in 
Gallarotti and Thompson.  In Geary v Rankine,135 Mr Rankine had moved from the home he 
shared with Mrs Geary in London to Halifax in order to run the guest house of which he was the 
legal owner and for which he had provided the purchase price.  After a short time Mrs Geary 
moved there to assist him.  It was seemingly common ground that he limited the amount of 
provision he made for her beyond housekeeping money because she was initially still married 
to a third party and he feared claims on any such provision by her husband and the children of 
that marriage. Mrs Geary asserted that when she questioned him about her future security and 
that of their son, Mr Rankine would say it was best for the business to remain in his ‘sole 
name’ so that she could build it up again if he went bankrupt, and that eventually he would 
give no response to such questions or give a non-committal one. 
Mrs Geary’s counsel conceded that no relevant common intention existed at the time 
the guest house was purchased, but submitted that the common intention of the parties had 
subsequently changed.  Lewison LJ emphasised that there must be a genuine common 
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intention, ‘that is, an intention common to both parties’.136  He considered it an 
‘impermissible leap’ to move from finding a common intention that the parties should run a 
business together to one that they were both beneficial owners of a business property for 
which one of them had paid.137  Lewison LJ’s analysis attaches significance both to ‘who pays 
for what’138 and also to express discussions, suggesting that the Rosset factors ultimately 
came to the fore even in the post-Jones era at least in a quasi-commercial case.  He was 
unconvinced that Mr Rankine had any intention that Mrs Geary should have an interest.  He 
had refused to ‘recognise’ her until she got divorced for reasons that Lewison LJ considered 
to be rational, and she had not done so until six years after the property was acquired.139  
Lewison LJ also pointed out that Mr Rankine was deliberately non-committal when she asked 
about her future security, which was again ‘inconsistent with an intention on Mr Rankine's 
part that Mrs Geary should have a beneficial interest’.140 Unfortunately for Mrs Rankine, 
whose case was not a particularly strong one, this analysis provides an interesting contrast to 
the ‘excuse’ cases pre-dating Stack in which interests were successfully claimed,141 and is a 
consequence of an attempt to focus literally on common intention that Stack and Jones 
required. Geary is an important reminder, reassuring to those concerned about uncertainty and 
unpredictability in this area of the law, that even where Stack and Jones have an effect for 
claimants seeking to assert or increase beneficial interests it is not necessarily a liberalising 
one. 
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Smith v Bottomley was another rare post-Jones Court of Appeal decision in which a 
claimant went away without a beneficial interest in the relevant property.142  Two of the parties 
were on-off cohabitants and fiancé(e)s, and Ms Smith had been engaged in Mr Bottomley’s 
‘militaria’ business.  While the case raised many issues, the pertinent claim in the Court of 
Appeal was that Ms Smith had a beneficial interest in a barn that the parties intended to develop 
into a new family home, although they separated without it ever really being used as such.  She 
claimed her interest on the basis of ‘a promise or promises’ made to her by Mr Bottomley.143  
The complicating factor was that the property had been conveyed into the name of a company 
incorporated and controlled by Mr Bottomley. Mr Bottomley had paid the deposit, and the 
company had paid the balance of the purchase price and funded the renovations to the barn.  The 
judge had held that Ms Smith did have a beneficial interest in the barn, though his findings were 
conflicting and were criticised by the Court of Appeal.  Sales J, giving the lead judgment in the 
appellate Court, held that: 
  
‘…unless it can be said that the Company shared responsibility with Mr Bottomley for 
the relevant promise regarding ownership of the Barn and that Ms Smith relied to her 
detriment in a serious way upon such promise by the Company, there is no good ground 
on which it can be said that Ms Smith has the benefit of an equitable interest which she 
can assert against the Company as the legal owner of the Barn’.144   
 
He emphasised that the only promise found by the judge to have been made by Mr Bottomley 
occurred before the company had been incorporated, and that in any case the alleged detrimental 
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reliance (consisting of an agreement to marry and giving up of alternative accommodation) also 
effectively pre-dated the company.  Smith is therefore of little help in enumerating the factors 
relevant to a common intention as between two cohabitants, though it may produce a resurgence 
in queries about detrimental reliance as an alternative means of defeating claims. 
 While Geary and Smith both had clear commercial elements in addition to being 
concerned with personal relationships, both were also genuine contests between cohabitants and 
it is not particularly clear that their claimants’ failures to establish an interest were caused by a 
reluctance on the part of the Court to favour Stack/Jones factors over Rosset factors.  An 
argument that such a reluctance is present can more easily be sustained in respect of Smith, but 
any such impression seems to have been created by the manner in which the case was pleaded.  
In any event, the outcomes of the two cases (as distinct from their legal analyses) do little to 
advance the claim that the Rosset criteria no longer apply in the light of Jones. 
 
(iv)   SUCCESSFUL LOWER COURT CLAIMS 
 
As with all of their Court of Appeal counterparts, most of the successful lower court claims to 
a beneficial interest by legal non-owners following an apparent application of Jones would 
have been equally successful had Rosset been applied.  This is true notwithstanding the fact 
that they represent successful Jones-inspired claims involving a variety of factual 
circumstances. 
In CPS v Piper,145 the husband (Graham) had originally acquired the whole legal title 
of Heathfields Farm from his former wife, Suzanne, as part of an arrangement they made 
when separating.  In return, Graham paid a minimum of £125,000146 to Suzanne towards a 
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new home for her.  After a complex factual inquiry, Holman J found that Graham’s current 
wife Janet had contributed £30,000 (held for her by her father) towards Graham’s 
arrangement with Suzanne.  Despite some serious inconsistencies in the evidence, the judge 
found that Graham and Janet ‘each reasonably understood the other party to be manifesting an 
intention that Janet had a shared interest in Heathfields Farm, even if that was not consciously 
formulated in his or her own mind’.147  The payment of money, in substance towards a 
purchase price even though the consideration for the transfer was expressed to be Suzanne’s 
‘natural love and affection’ for Graham,148 means that Janet, like the claimant in Gallarotti, 
may have qualified for an interest even under the older Rosset principles, and indeed the judge 
implied that Janet could have had an interest proportionate to her financial contribution under 
a resulting trust had it been open to him to decide the case on that basis.149  This is true in 
spite of Dixon’s downplaying the significance of the fact that Janet’s conduct was the 
payment of money, emphasising that Jones was ‘treated as the applicable authority’ and 
asserting that ‘it is difficult to see a return to the Rosset approach now that the genie is out of 
the bottle’,150 an argument fortified by the references to Jones in appellate sole-owner cases 
considered above.151  In the end, Holman J concluded that the parties in CPS v Piper inferred 
a common intention that Janet had a 50% interest in Heathfields Farm. 
 Another case with factual similarities to those considered in the previous section of 
the article, Rubin v Dweck, involved an unsuccessful challenge by a husband’s trustee in 
bankruptcy to the transfer of the matrimonial home from the husband’s ‘sole name’ to that of 
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the wife.152  One issue to be decided was whether the wife had a beneficial interest in the 
home at the time it was purchased.  All of the purchase money for the house was provided by 
the wife’s mother, and the Registrar found that the mother had intended the purchase money 
to be a gift to the husband and the wife equally.  The Registrar held that the purpose of the gift 
and the use of it for that purpose, coupled with the fact that the wife contributed to the 
purchase price via the gift, meant that ‘it is to be inferred…that there was a common intention 
to share the beneficial interest equally’ at the time of the transfer.153  He accepted that the 
house was put into the husband’s name in case he needed to use it as security for small 
business loans.  When assessing the bona fide nature of the parties’ later agreement to transfer 
the house into the name of the wife, the Recorder focused on the Insolvency Act rather than 
any argument that the husband retained a beneficial interest after the transfer.  As in Piper, 
however, the result in Rubin as regards the original purchase probably would have been 
defensible following Rosset, even if the principles outlined were clearly influenced by at least 
Stack. 
The Northern Irish case of Bank of Scotland v Brogan,154 by contrast, did not involve 
direct financial contributions by the legal non-owner.  Nevertheless, Deeny J significantly 
cited several factors supporting his conclusion that the defendant husband and wife had a 
common intention that the legal non-owning wife was to have an interest in their pre-marital 
and marital home.  One of these, consistently with Rosset, were the husband’s ‘saying that 
what was hers was his and his hers’, albeit in a ‘light-hearted tone’.155  But the judge 
considered that comments such as the husband’s ‘might well fall short of being enough to 
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displace the exclusive legal title to the property of the first defendant’ if it stood alone.156  He 
therefore bolstered his finding with reference to a number of other features of the case, 
including the wife’s financial contribution to the improvement of the property, the fact of 
eventual marriage, which in his view ‘indicates a higher degree of commitment between the 
parties than merely a decision to live together and…a greater likelihood that property was to 
be jointly owned’,157 the wife’s help on the husband’s farm and her care for ‘her ailing 
mother-in-law’.158 The judge then proceeded separately to consider the quantum of the wife’s 
interest (reaching a conclusion that she was entitled to a half share), which seemingly 
confirms that the preceding analysis related to the establishment of that interest.  It is 
interesting that the judge’s assessment of the husband’s remarks is arguably more restrictive 
than that necessitated by Lord Bridge, even if Deeny J went on to adopt an holistic analysis 
consistent with a Jones-inspired approach unrestrained by Rosset.  Nevertheless, once again 
the result in the case could still be seen as consistent with Rosset, and the case does not 
provide conclusive evidence that the law has moved on in Northern Ireland or beyond. 
 
(v)  ‘UNSUCCESSFUL’ LOWER COURT CLAIMS 
 
In Patel v Vigh, Mr Patel’s claim to a beneficial interest in the home that had been vested in 
the ‘sole name’ of his deceased cohabitant (Mrs Vigh) failed.159  Judge Halpern QC rejected 
the claim largely because of difficulties with the available evidence, and particularly that of 
Mr Patel himself.  The judge found insufficient evidence of the claimed improvements made 
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to the property by Mr Patel, financial contributions at the time of purchase and by way of 
mortgage instalments that he made, or financial and non-financial contributions to Mrs Vigh’s 
café business.160   
In spite of his conclusions on the facts, it is significant for present purposes that Judge 
Halpern considered improvements and business contributions to be at all relevant to the 
establishment of a beneficial interest, both of which appear inconsistent with Rosset.  This is 
true even though the judge doubted that improvements made before Mrs Vigh had used her 
right-to-buy discount (and therefore while she was still a council tenant) could give rise to a 
beneficial interest and noted the possibility that the claimant’s alleged business contributions 
were ‘so remote’ from the property that they could not give rise to a beneficial interest.161 
Finally, the context of Aspden v Elvy involved Outlaithe Farm, which included 
Outlaithe Barn.162 In contrast to many of the lower court cases considered in this section, it 
concerned a genuine dispute between former cohabitants, which essentially related to the 
barn.  The judge refused to find that the parties had a common intention to share the farm at 
the time it was acquired, since the non-owner Ms Elvy had paid none of the outgoings and (by 
her own admission) ‘there were no express discussions as to any interest she might have’.163  
References to ‘our house’ made by the parties were considered insufficient,164 and Judge 
Behrens’ approach on this point has much in common with Rosset.  The judge was prepared 
to accept that it was ‘at least arguable’ that work on the farm carried out by Ms Elvy post 
acquisition ‘gives rise to an inference that the common intention of the parties had changed so 
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that it was intended that Ms Elvy should have some interest’.165  Judge Behrens was also 
influenced, however, by ‘the caution expressed by Sir John Chadwick’ in the restrictive case 
of James v Thomas about such scenarios,166 implying that Jones has had a limited role in 
developing the law on this point.  Ultimately, however, Judge Behrens did not ‘find it 
necessary to determine’ whether Ms Elvy had an interest in the farm,167 seemingly because 
the dispute centred around the barn.  As with the unsuccessful Court of Appeal claims, it is 
difficult to sustain an argument that the failure of the claims in Patel and (considered thus far) 
in Aspden were caused by a focus on Rosset at the expense of Jones.  Both Judge Halpern and 
Judge Behrens would apparently have been content to move beyond Rosset had the evidence 
in their respective cases been stronger. 
 Whatever the perceived relevance of Jones v Kernott, however, none of the judicial 
conclusions on the acquisition of a beneficial interest by a legal non-owner analysed in this 
section of the article clearly moved beyond Rosset in terms of their outcome.  As will 
nevertheless become clear, our discussion of Aspden v Elvy must be continued in the next 
section, since Judge Behrens arguably reached another conclusion that was inconsistent with 
Rosset.   
 
(c)  A novel outcome? 
 
In spite of the restrictive approach taken in relation to the farm in Aspden v Elvy, Judge 
Behrens’ analysis as regards the barn could (rather schizophrenically) place the case in the 
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third category considered at the outset of this article by permitting an outcome inconsistent 
with Rosset in the light of Jones.  
Judge Behrens found that Mr Aspden did not retain any interest in the barn when he 
originally transferred it into Ms Elvy’s name, ostensibly for reasons relating to creditors and 
inheritance tax.  The judge held that there was ‘nothing in Mr Aspden’s words or conduct that 
would entitle [Judge Behrens] to infer that there was any common intention that he should 
retain any interest in Outlaithe Barn’.168  Significantly, however, Judge Behrens did find that 
Mr Aspden made considerable financial and non-financial contributions to the conversion of 
the barn.  The judge held that, in spite of the absence of express discussions, Mr Aspden had 
been successful in demonstrating that ‘the common intention of the parties (objectively 
ascertained) was that he should have an interest as a result of the substantial contributions 
both in financial and physical terms that he made to the works’.169  Mr Aspden had not 
intended his contributions to be gifts made in recognition of his relationship with Ms Elvy and 
her status as mother of his children, and he had hoped to live in the barn once the conversion 
was complete. Indeed, it was found that as a result of his expenditure, his only other effective 
source of accommodation would have been a caravan.  Via a process of imputation, Judge 
Behrens found Mr Aspden to have an interest of 25% in the property, representing a ‘fair 
return’ on his financial and physical investment.170 
In holding that Mr Aspden had established an interest in the barn, the judge appears to 
have moved on from the Rosset criteria and taken an holistic approach, since the financial 
contributions made by Mr Aspden related not to its acquisition but its improvement.  This is 
true even if Mr Aspden could not realistically have been expected to make direct financial 
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contributions to the ‘acquisition’ of the barn at the relevant time, since he had originally 
acquired it by himself and then chosen to transfer it to Ms Elvy.  The matter is complicated by 
the judge’s assertion that he was ‘fortified’171 in his conclusion by the pre-Rosset decision in 
Bernard v Josephs, which was in fact a ‘joint names’ case.172  In particular, Judge Behrens 
cited Griffiths LJ’s remarks in Bernard to the effect that ‘[i]t might in exceptional 
circumstances be inferred that the parties agreed to alter their beneficial interests after the 
house was bought’,173 and his example of a legal non-owner who afterwards ‘used a legacy to 
build an extra floor to make more room for the children’.174  In Griffiths LJ’s view the 
‘obvious inference’ in those circumstances would be an agreement that the legal non-owning 
partner ‘should acquire a share in the greatly increased value of the house produced by her 
money’.175  Judge Behrens held that ‘the contributions made by Mr Aspden are akin to the 
case envisaged by Griffiths LJ’.176 
The complicating factor is that the citation of Bernard may itself undermine the 
suggestion that Judge Behrens was moving on from Rosset.  The judge had himself found 
Bernard to be consistent with Rosset in the pre-Jones (but post-Stack) case of Hopton v 
Miller,177 albeit that on the facts of that case the legal owner had paid for all the relevant 
repairs and improvements himself and the claimant could not legitimately assert a beneficial 
interest.178 Moreover, even in the ungenerous post-Stack case of James v Thomas, Sir John 
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Chadwick had cited Griffiths LJ’s remarks in Bernard in support of his conclusion that ‘in the 
absence of an express post-acquisition agreement, a court will be slow to infer from conduct 
alone that parties intended to vary existing beneficial interests established at the time of 
acquisition’.179  Sir John’s conclusion was approved in the subsequent post-Stack decision in 
Morris v Morris,180 and in turn in the restrictive post-Jones case of Re Ali.181  It is also 
possible that Griffiths LJ’s ‘exceptional circumstances’ could be matched with Lord Rosset’s 
‘extremely unlikely’ scenario where something less than a financial contribution would ‘do’. 
However, it is not clear that Bernard and Rosset are consistent with each other, since 
Lord Bridge did not expressly include indirect improvement-based financial contributions in 
his methods of inference. Indeed, his Lordship said explicitly in Rosset that ‘a common 
intention by spouses that a house is to be renovated as a “joint venture”’ is not something that 
‘throws any light on their intentions with respect to the beneficial ownership of the 
property’.182  In his view, even the considerable manual work of the claimant in Eves v 
Eves183 ‘fell far short of such conduct as would by itself have supported the claim in the 
absence of an express representation by the male partner that she was to have such an 
interest’.184 It would admittedly be possible to distinguish financing improvements from 
carrying them out (though Judge Behrens did not draw such a sharp dividing line), and the 
recognition of a contribution leading to an increase in the value of a property is at most a 
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modest extension to the Rosset criteria as compared to recognising indirect financial or wholly 
domestic contributions.  In spite of this, a combination of Stack and Jones could ultimately be 
said to have diverted attention from the strictures of Rosset and legitimised direct recourse in 
Aspden to older authority more liberal than it in a manner that affected the outcome of the 
case.   
In the light of the number of cases producing orthodox results, the degree of internal 
incoherence caused by Judge Behrens’ own conservative conclusion on the farm and the 
doubts about whether the recognition of improvements really is novel, however, Aspden is not 
a particularly unequivocal sign of developments to come in dispensing with Rosset.  It could 
be unfair to say that the Court of Appeal and the lower courts have already squandered the 
apparent opportunity to consign Rosset to history, even if they could be criticised for their 
lack of clarity on the point, since in the cases arising so far they did not always need to move 
beyond Rosset in order to open the door to the legitimately liberal approach to quantification 
following Stack and Jones.  But on the basis of the authorities considered in this article a 
conservative approach could easily take root, such that another Supreme Court decision is 
necessary conclusively to remove the straitjacket of Rosset from the establishment of an 
interest in a shared home via a constructive trust. 
 
4.   CONCLUSION 
 
This article has analysed what will in all likelihood become a fraction of the case law where 
Jones v Kernott is relevant.  What it has shown is that the Supreme Court in that case, 
building on the earlier decision in Stack v Dowden in a frustratingly opaque manner, appeared 
to invite the lower courts to move beyond the restrictive Rosset criteria in cases where a party 
to a personal relationship seeks to establish a beneficial interest in a shared home, arguably 
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leaving the lower courts with a conflict of obiter dicta at the highest judicial level that has 
caused a considerable lack of clarity in some subsequent decisions, particularly in the High 
Court. Despite encouraging rhetoric (along with some absences of discouraging rhetoric) 
about the reach of Jones in cases from a wide range of contexts, judges in both the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal have been largely unable, but occasionally unwilling, to accept the 
Supreme Court’s invitation in a manner affecting outcome as yet, though in any event caution 
was perhaps inevitable in the light of the stare decisis principle.185 It is unclear whether the 
paucity of reported cases with the potential to facilitate a novel outcome, which admittedly 
reduces the scope for those decided cases to be regarded as unjust, can be explained by mere 
coincidence, a reluctance to litigate given the uncertainty on whether a legal non-owner will 
gain an interest at all, or a genuine absence of difficulty in meeting the Rosset criteria on the 
part of most modern legal non-owning cohabitants.186 
Whatever the reason for the trend in fact patterns reaching the Court of Appeal and the 
lower courts, it means that a Supreme Court case dealing squarely with a ‘sole legal owner’ 
scenario is likely to be required before the vexed question considered in this article can be 
resolved.  Even if the law has been liberated from Rosset, moreover, the Supreme Court may 
still have to clarify precisely how a common intention is to be inferred directly from conduct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 See M Harding and I Malkin, ‘The High Court of Australia’s Obiter Dicta and Decision-Making in Lower 
Courts’ (2012) 34 Sydney Law Review 239 for a discussion of the significance of appellate obiter dicta in 
Australia.  
186 Judging by the level of news coverage, the case of Curran v Collins [2013] EWCA Civ 382 (on which only 
the judgment concerning position to appeal is available at the time of writing) could become the new archetypal 
illustration of the legal non-owner’s difficulties.  See, eg, K O’Callaghan ‘“Unfair” laws for cohabiting couples 
highlighted again’ (BBC News Online, 6 February 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21337154>; V 
Ward ‘Cohabiting laws unfair on women, says judge’ (The Daily Telegraph, 24 January 2013); L Tobin, ‘Get it 
write if you cohabit’  (The London Evening Standard, 5 February 2013).  
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beyond Lord Bridge’s criteria, and the particular factual configuration of cases may become 
more influential than it currently appears to be.  Given the current political climate,187 a 
relevant Supreme Court decision somehow seems more likely than a move to provide a 
statutory remedy for a non-legal-owning cohabitant, even if such a scheme would be much 
more desirable. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Cf. the Cohabitation Rights Bill 2013-14, a Private Member’s Bill introduced into the House of Lords by the 
Liberal Democrat peer Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames in October 2013.  
